January 22, 2013
Overzealous Prosecutors & The Culture Of Convictions

A reader asks:

I hear about “overzealous prosecutors” from time to time — prosecutors who throw justice out the window and just try to get someone convicted. Is this really a problem? And can you provide me with some examples of overzealous prosecution, if so?

I’d be happy to oblige your request.

As a preliminary matter, you should read Ken White’s article on prosecutorial overreach.  Ken is a former Federal prosecutor who has “done the work,” so to speak, and directly experienced the “conviction at any cost” culture that permeates many prosecutors’ offices:

[S]tate and federal prosecutors routinely fall short of [their perceived] ideal. There are too many stories of convictions obtained through subornation of perjury, through suppression of exculpatory evidence, and through the willful use of unreliable, wrongfully obtained confessions … too many prosecutorial agencies develop a culture that treats victory as the only acceptable result; any defeat is a humiliating rebuke. They simply don’t contemplate the possibility that a not-guilty verdict might be the just result. 

Of course, prosecutors have an ethical duty to the Bar to not prosecute crimes when they aren’t convinced of the Defendant’s guilt, or for any reason other than to serve the interests of justice.  And yet it isn’t hard to find stories of prosecutors who pursued charges against defendants for political, professional, or perhaps even personal reasons (see further below).  

One reason prosecutors can do this is because they have nearly limitless say in how the laws are enforced, particularly at the Federal level.  As the U.S. Attorney’s manual notes:

The statutory duty to prosecute for all offenses against the United States (28 U.S.C. § 547) carries with it the authority necessary to perform this duty. The USA is invested by statute and delegation from the Attorney General with the broadest discretion in the exercise of such authority.

Another reason for this, as Mike Spindell notes, that prosecutors’ offices often serve as the first stepping stone to a successful political career, because everybody loves to hear about a prosecutor who’s “tough on crime:”

Many of today’s most prominent politicians began their legal careers as prosecutors and used their office to advance themselves. Rudy Giuliani parlayed his headline grabbing antics as a Federal Prosecutor into great wealth and a political career that made him a Presidential candidate. Yet most of the “convictions” that brought him fame and media attention were overturned at the appellate level. His grandstanding, such as the arrest of a young stockbroker accompanied by TV cameras ultimately resulted in the man’s acquittal, yet the impression of Giuliani as a “fighter for justice” remained in the people’s minds.

In one particularly egregious example of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal investigation for selfish reasons, U.S. Attorney Tanya Treadway vindictively pursued a Grand Jury indictment against Pain relief advocate Siobhan Reynolds, whom Treadway tried to silence after Reynolds began publicly advocating on behalf of a doctor whom Treadway was trying to indict.  Needless to say, Treadway was not happy that Reynolds was trying to make Treadway look bad:

She first tried to get a gag order preventing Reynolds from talking about the case in public. Judge Belot said no. Several of Schneider’s patients say they were then visited by federal agents, who forced their way into their homes and took documents (including a letter Schneider had sent one of them from prison). Treadway next asked the judge to move the case out of town, arguing that Reynolds’ advocacy had tainted the jury pool (never mind Treadway’s own press conference). Belot denied the change of venue request, too.

Treadway then launched a grand jury investigation of Reynolds, presumably for obstruction of justice, though she told Reynolds’ attorney that she would neither confirm nor deny that an investigation was under way. She issued Reynolds a sweeping subpoena demanding all of her records for every case in which she has ever advocated on behalf of a doctor or patient—every e-mail, letter, and phone record, as well as Facebook wall posts and status updates. Complying cost Reynolds tens of thousands of dollars and hundreds of hours of labor. With help from the ACLU, Reynolds sued to have the subpoena quashed. She lost. A second judge, Julie A. Robinson, hit her with a $200 fine for contempt each day she didn’t comply. Robinson also declined Reynolds’ request to make the subpoena and related proceedings public, effectively imposing a seal on the subpoena, Reynolds’ challenge to it, and any materials related to either.

In time, Reynolds was forced into hiding, as she was unable to stand up to the enormous resources of Treadway’s office.

There are countless examples similar to this.  George Will wrote in July of 2012 about the sad case of Nancy Black, an extraordinarily talented marine biologist who’s career was destroyed by federal authorities after someone on one of her boats whistled at a whale.  During the ensuing investigation, federal agents proceeded to charge her with various crimes stemming from this and another incident, in which she allegedly fed killer whales in violation of federal law, a charge that bares only scant resemblance to the facts:

To facilitate photographing the killers’ feeding habits, she cut a hole in one of the floating slabs of blubber and, through the hole, attached a rope to stabilize the slab while a camera on a pole recorded the whales’ underwater eating.

So she is charged with “feeding” killer whales that were already feeding on a gray whale they had killed. She could more plausibly be accused of interfering with the feeding.

Nancy Black cashed in her life savings to pay for the legal fees, which are well in excess of $100,000.  She has also been cut off from her friends and family, after federal agents told her colleagues not to speak to her.  She has also had her financial accounts subpoenaed, despite the fact that the crimes she is charged with have absolutely nothing to do with her finances.  If convicted, she faces up to 20 years in prison, and it all started because someone on a boat whistled at a whale—and the feds decided to slam her, interests of justice be damned.

Other examples abound, of course.  And these anecdotes are say nothing of the common practice overcharging defendants with crimes that prosecutors know they can’t prove in court to scare Defendants into taking a plea.  As Jonathan Rapping from John Marshall Law School notes:

Every day, all across America, prosecutors charge people with crimes that the criminal justice system is not sufficiently funded to handle. Most of the accused are indigent citizens forced to rely on the services of over-burdened public defenders. In a system that lacks the resources to resolve these cases at trial, or even to spend the requisite capital at the pre-trial stage, prosecutors have found creative ways to process the vast majority of these cases without the expense associated with providing the accused actual justice.

This doesn’t mean that it’s always unjust for a prosecutor to offer Defendants a plea deal.  In fact, Defense attorneys regularly advise their clients to accept pleas that they believe are in their clients’ best interest.  And to be sure, there are plenty of ethical prosecutors who do their best to enforce the law with a velvet glove rather than a mailed fist.  But the ethical parameters of the plea bargain system change when a prosecutor overcharges a Defendant to scare them into taking a plea—something which happens with an unsettling degree of frequency at both the federal and state level.

With all this being said: there are prosecutors out there that genuinely try to do the right thing.  I myself was almost hired by a NYC prosecutor’s office this year, in the hopes that I could spend my time there trying to soften the blows of the criminal justice system by giving out as many breaks as I responsibly could.  Unfortunately, in too many cases, prosecutor’s offices become permeated by a culture of self-righteousness that leads inexorably down a road in which conviction rates serve as a proxy for real justice.  Many genuinely good prosecutors find themselves unable to escape the pitfalls and incentives that lead prosecutors to exercise their office in a vindictive or unjust manner.  As Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor in Washington D.C., said regarding his chosen career: “I became a prosecutor because I hate bullies.  I stopped being a prosecutor because I hate bullies.” 

That doesn’t mean every prosecutor abuses their authority.  But the number who do is troubling, to say the least.

January 20, 2013
"In a system truly interested in justice the position of Prosecutor would be one of impartiality, with their actions based on the evidence and on the Law. Sadly, for most of American history this has not been the case. Many who become prosecutors do so because they understand that they could use their “record” in that office to advance their careers. Their conviction rate and their prosecuting noteworthy trials elevate their public fame. Many of today’s most prominent politicians began their legal careers as prosecutors and used their office to advance themselves. Rudy Giuliani parlayed his headline grabbing antics as a Federal Prosecutor into great wealth and a political career that made him a Presidential candidate. Yet most of the “convictions” that brought him fame and media attention were overturned at the appellate level. His grandstanding, such as the arrest of a young stockbroker accompanied by TV cameras ultimately resulted in the man’s acquittal, yet the impression of Giuliani as a “fighter for justice” remained in the people’s minds."

Mike Spindell

January 17, 2013
"There has also been a trend over the last 20 years or so toward laws that don’t require prosecutors to show criminal intent. This means you can be prosecuted for crimes you had no idea you were breaking — even laws you actively tried not to break. A 2010 study co-authored by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Heritage Foundation found that in its rush to criminalize more and more behavior, Congress has been passing poorly-drafted laws that increasingly lack any requirement at all to show intent. Even when intent is included, the study found, it tends to be vague and open to interpretation (which also means open to abuse) by prosecutors."

Radley Balko

August 14, 2012
"I became a prosecutor because I hate bullies. I stopped being a prosecutor because I hate bullies."

Paul Butler

July 30, 2012
"

The protracted and pointless tormenting of [Scientist Nancy Black] illustrates the thesis of Harvey Silverglate’s invaluable 2009 book, “Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent.” Silverglate, a civil liberties lawyer in Boston, chillingly demonstrates how the mad proliferation of federal criminal laws — which often are too vague to give fair notice of what behavior is proscribed or prescribed — means that “our normal daily activities expose us to potential prosecution at the whim of a government official.” Such laws, which enable government zealots to accuse almost anyone of committing three felonies in a day, do not just enable government misconduct, they incite prosecutors to intimidate decent people who never had culpable intentions. And to inflict punishments without crimes.


By showing that Kafka was a realist, Black’s misfortune may improve the nation: The more Americans learn about their government’s abuse of criminal law for capricious bullying, the more likely they are to recoil in a libertarian direction and put Leviathan on a short leash.

"

George Will, discussing the on-going litigation involving Nancy Black, a marine biologist who became the target of a federal investigation after somebody on her boat whistled at a whale.  An investigation ensued to determine whether the whistling constituted “harassment of a marine mammal,” an environmental crime.  The NOAA found that no harassment took place after viewing a video of the incident, but the investigation continued after the feds believed that the tape was doctored in violation of the 1863 False Claims Act.  Black has spent over $100,000 in legal fees defending herself, and has become isolated from at least one close friend after her scientific colleagues were told by the government to inform investigators if Black tried to speak with any of them.

A promising scientific career has been destroyed because somebody whistled.  Prosecutorial indiscretion at its worst.

July 18, 2012
Is The L.A. District Attorney’s Office Instructing Its Prosecutors To Violate The Constitution?

Ken White, guest blogging at the Agitator, discusses a revelatory lawsuit brought by the ACLU and private California firm Bird Marella, which alleges that an internal document in the L.A. D.A.’s office instructs prosecutors to handle exculpatory evidence in a manner inconsistent with their duties under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, California Supreme Court precedent, and California law:

Last week the ACLU of Southern California and the firm Bird Marella filed suit seeking to prohibit the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office from enforcing its “Special Directive 10-06,” a policy memo dictating how the office’s hundreds of prosecutors are to treat exculpatory evidence in the tens of thousands of cases the prosecute. You can read it at the ACLU site or here.

If you click on the last link in the quoted paragraph above, you will be directed to a  letter to counsel from Bird Marella detailing the grounds of the lawsuit.  In sum, the L.A. D.A.’s Special Directive 10-06 contains a so-called “Brady Protocol,” which governs the D.A.’s standards for when exculpatory evidence will be placed into the “Brady Alert System,” and turned over to defendants.  The name of the protocol is a reference to Brady v. Maryland, the landmark Supreme Court case requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants and their lawyers “where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment.”  

The lawsuit alleges that the Brady Protocol embedded in Special Directive 10-06 is inconsistent with both the U.S. Constitution and California law.  One example:

The Brady Protocol instructs reviewing deputies: “The decision to include information in the Brady Alert System will be made using the standard of clear and convincing evidence, a degree of proof which is higher than preponderance of the evidence but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, without clear and convincing evidence that the potential Brady impeachment evidence is reliable and credible, it will not be included in the Brady Alert System.”  

But the California Supreme Court says: “It is not the role of the prosecutor to decide that facially exculpatory evidence need not be turned over because the prosecutor thinks the information is false.  It is ‘the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s private deliberations’ that is the ‘chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.’”

After personally reviewing the largest inconsistencies, this seems pretty open and shut.  I think chances are quite good that the ACLU and Bird Marella will prevail in getting the protocol changed.

In some sense, the special directive reflects an honest effort by prosecutors in the L.A. D.A.’s office to come up with a policy for administering their responsibilities under Brady in a manner that splits the difference between their dual role as ministers of justice and zealous advocates for the people of California.  On the other hand, internal documents like this are plagued by the inherent cultural conflicts which pervade prosecutors’ offices generally, as Ken ably points out:

[S]peaking as a former prosecutor, I submit that prosecutors hold a very cramped and narrow view of what is exculpatory and what might influence a jury, and are culturally incapable of making a reliable call about what is likely “material.” No doubt that’s exactly why that’s not the standard for what they are supposed to turn over.

Sorting out conflicts of interest are a huge part of the legal profession.  Many large firms have entire practices devoted to dealing with and identifying professional and ethical conflicts that may arise during the course of a given transaction or litigation.  And when it comes to potential conflicts of interest, prosecutors’ office are no different: many prosecutors honestly want to live up to their professional obligations to defendants, and try to play by the rules.  But the cultural conflict of interest that Ken identifies makes it problematic to rely on prosecutors’ offices to decide for themselves how they’re going to interpret their legal obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence.  They are institutionally incentivized to interpret their responsibilities in a way that’s favorable to making their job easier.  To wit: as Bird Marella’s letter to counsel points out, the law is relatively clear about what is required.  Yet the Special Directive seems to be in clear discord with the law in several respects.

The sad part is that a truly ethical prosecutor who zealously represents the interest of the people should have no problem disclosing evidence if there is even the slightest chance that it’s exculpatory.  The dual role of the prosecutor is not tantamount to maximizing convictions; zealously representing the people in a wholistic sense is derivative of their duty to serve the interests of justice.  Hiding evidence that may lead a jury to believe that a defendant is innocent cannot possibly serve the interests of justice.  In our system, the guilt of a defendant is not for the prosecutor to determine.  Justice is served in our system by allowing a jury of a defendant’s peers to have all the facts in front of them, and decide unanimously that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the prosecutor refuses to allow all the facts to be known to the jury, he or she is undermining the very mechanism by which justice is allegedly served in our system.  

It shouldn’t be this hard for a prosecutor to cheerfully shoulder this burden.  Unfortunately, prosecutors’ offices around the country regularly drift from this ideal, preferring instead to wrack up convictions, concerning themselves with “winning” rather than doing real justice.  Criminal defendants become viewed as uniformly pathological rather than human beings with complex motivations and lives.  This of course makes it easier to justify throwing the “worst of the worst” in prison for decades at a time, or threatening unsophisticated defendants with overloaded indictments to terrify them into taking a plea deal that’s not in their interests.  When you are part of a culture that makes it easy to systematically dehumanize defendants, you tend to feel less sympathy for them as a class.  

That, my friends, is a conflict of interest.  And it has consequences for the administration of justice, as demonstrated by Special Directive 10-06.  I have no doubt that the document was crafted in good faith.  And that’s really the biggest problem with it.

June 26, 2012
"Every day, all across America, prosecutors charge people with crimes that the criminal justice system is not sufficiently funded to handle. Most of the accused are indigent citizens forced to rely on the services of over-burdened public defenders. In a system that lacks the resources to resolve these cases at trial, or even to spend the requisite capital at the pre-trial stage, prosecutors have found creative ways to process the vast majority of these cases without the expense associated with providing the accused actual justice. With an ever-expanding list of behaviors and actions deemed criminal, and increasingly harsh sentencing options for these offenses, prosecutors are able to put pressure on most criminal defendants to give up many of their most fundamental Constitutional rights and plead guilty to avoid potentially draconian outcomes."

Jonathan Rapping, “Who’s Guarding the Henhouse?  How the American Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect.”

April 19, 2012
Convicted defendants left uninformed of forensic flaws found by Justice Dept.

Justice Department officials have known for years that flawed forensic work might have led to the convictions of potentially innocent people, but prosecutors failed to notify defendants or their attorneys even in many cases they knew were troubled.

In one Texas case, Benjamin Herbert Boyle was executed in 1997, more than a year after the Justice Department began its review. Boyle would not have been eligible for the death penalty without the FBI’s flawed work, according to a prosecutor’s memo.

Another day, another massive violation of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8.

April 15, 2012
"The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle course and simply have a citizen’s friends interviewed. The prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be indicted and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the defense never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a public trial. If he obtains a conviction, the prosecutor can still make recommendations as to sentence, as to whether the prisoner should get probation or a suspended sentence, and after he is put away, as to whether he is a fit subject for parole. While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst."

Justice Robert H. Jackson (then U.S. Attorney General), “The Federal Prosecutor,” 1940

February 22, 2012
The Ethical Duties Of A Prosecutor

Not that these get applied very often, but a boy can dream…

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, MR 3.8

Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities Of A Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;

(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:

(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;

(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and

(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;

(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.

(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:

(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and

(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,

(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and

(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.

(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

Thankfully, MR 8.3 sets up a mandatory reporting regime (suspected ethical misconduct by other lawyers), so if you do plan on becoming a lawyer, and have some sort of direct evidence of wrong-doing by a prosecutor, you can report him/her to the state bar, and if they find grounds, they’ll initiate a disciplinary proceeding.

It bears repeating that I say this as a person who wants to work in a D.A.’s office.  I’m not hating on prosecutors.  It’s just good government and respect for the rule of law.  The ethical rules as they stand are fantastic.  They just need to be enforced against the folks who flout them for the sake of winning cases.

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