May 31, 2012
Modeling Police Accountability

Recently, I wrote an article (which will hopefully be published) criticizing Scalia’s 2006 majority opinion in Hudson v. Michigan.  In that opinion, Scalia and his fellow concurring justices on the Supreme Court held that the Exclusionary Rule did not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce rule.  Scalia believed that it was not necessary to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule because, inter alia, police departments seemed to be exhibiting greater degrees of “professionalism,” suggesting that they take violations of constitutional rights seriously.  Scalia claimed that internal review procedures and professional discipline would serve to adequately chastize misbehaving officers.  Here is the operative paragraph of Scalia’s opinion, in its entirety:

Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. Even as long ago as 1980 we felt it proper to “assume” that unlawful police behavior would “be dealt with appropriately” by the authorities, United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727 , n. 5 (1980), but we now have increasing evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. There have been “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police officers.” S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950–1990, p. 51 (1993). Numerous sources are now available to teach officers and their supervisors what is required of them under this Court’s cases, how to respect constitutional guarantees in various situations, and how to craft an effective regime for internal discipline. See, e.g., D. Waksman & D. Goodman, The Search and Seizure Handbook (2d ed. 2006); A. Stone & S. DeLuca, Police Administration: An Introduction (2d ed. 1994); E. Thibault, L. Lynch, & R. McBridge, Proactive Police Management (4th ed. 1998). Failure to teach and enforce constitutional requirements exposes municipalities to financial liability. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378388 (1989) . Moreover, modern police forces are staffed with professionals; it is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which can limit successful careers, will not have a deterrent effect. There is also evidence that the increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance police accountability.

My paper piggy-backed on Radley Balko’s now infamous criticism of Scalia’s claim, which Balko termed “the New Professionalism.”  Much like Balko, I set out to provide examples that contradicted Scalia’s claim.  But more importantly, I identified several factors which make it difficult for Internal Affairs Units and prosecutors to hold police accountable in the way that Scalia asserts.  Those factors can be summed up as follows:

1. The Police-Prosecutor Relationship.  There are well-documented sociological and subcultural phenomena that define the professional relationship between police and prosecutors which disincentivize prosecutors from filling criminal charges against malfeasant police.  These phenomena generally manifest in two ways: a) Law enforcement officials stonewall a prosecutor’s criminal investigation of their fellow officers (i.e. “the Blue Shield” or “Blue Wall of Silence”), and b) Police expect solidarity from prosecutors when it comes to the daily grind of law enforcement. Both phenomena, for various reasons, make it difficult for prosecutors to press charges against police.  The “Blue Shield” also disincentivizes Internal Affairs officers from disciplining their fellow officers.

2. Fourth Amendment & Qualified Immunity.  The Supreme Court’s slow-and-steady redefinition of “objective reasonableness” for the purpose of analyzing Fourth Amendment violations has inadvertently increased the scope of Qualified Immunity protection for police officers whose injurious conduct is increasingly viewed as “constitutionally reasonable” by the courts.  This makes it more difficult to hold law enforcement officials liable through a civil suit for monetary damages, because Qualified Immunity renders them immune from suit unless they violate a “clearly established constitutional right.”  So when courts expand the definition of what is “objectively reasonable” for law enforcement officials, they expand by an equivalent measure the amount of police conduct is protected by Qualified Immunity.    

3.  Abrogation of Common Law Right-to-Resist.  Many state jurisdictions have abrogated the right to resist an unlawful arrest.  In those jurisdictions that have abrogated the common-law rule, this leads to two outcomes: a) officers are incentivized to behave with impunity because they know that they are literally “untouchable,” and b) individuals who do resist are often prosecuted for Assault on a Police Officer.  As Scott Greenfield explained in 2011, these laws essentially give police officers the ability to engage in criminal behavior with little fear of prosecution, because it is often extraordinarily difficult to distinguish between an unlawful arrest, and a lawful arrest that is merely accompanied by illegal conduct.

After discussing these three issues, I suggested reforms that can help increase the level of accountability in police departments.  One of those reforms was for prosecutor’s offices to create a separate, distinct unit for investigating allegations of police misconduct.  By removing prosecutors from the daily grind of police activity, you remove many of the negative incentives that define the professional relationship between prosecutors and police.  The police expectation of solidarity from prosecutors largely comes from the fact that police and prosecutors work closely with one another, and often develop close working relationships.  This is much less likely to happen when the prosecutors who are investigating allegations of police misconduct have less day-to-day contact with the police in their jurisdiction, leading to more objective prosecutors who are less afraid to bring charges against police officers who commit crimes while wearing their uniform.

With this being said, I was heartened to see my recommendation vindicated when I read a story in the Washington Post about a police officer who was recently indicted in Virginia on charges related to the fatal shooting of a female motorist:

The indictment, handed up by a special grand jury, is highly unusual. There have been few cases in the United States in which an officer has faced so serious a charge in connection with actions taken on duty.

Indeed.  But part of what makes this case unusual is in the way it was handled.  Tim Lynch at Cato’s NPMRP elaborates:

First, a separate police agency was brought into the case.  All too often the same agency ends up investigating itself.  Second, a special prosecutor was appointed to the case.  That was another important move.  The local prosecutors work with the local police week to week.  They depend on the police to help them win in court.  Even if there is evidence of wrongdoing, prosecutors often look the other way so as not to “rock the boat.”

Precisely. When these sort of common sense reforms are put into action, they increase the likelihood that law enforcement officials will be held accountable in cases where they exceed the bounds of their authority.  Everybody understands that police often have to make split-second decisions in dangerous situations.  But it doesn’t follow that they should be granted impunity as a result.  When a law enforcement official’s conduct rises to the level of criminal culpability, he ought to be held accountable, same as anyone else.  These types of reforms ensure that prosecutors can play a more meaningful role in that process.

May 31, 2012
"These [Distracted Driving] laws give police officers yet another pretext to fabricate traffic stops. People are stopped every day for suspected cell phone use or other diversions and then subjected to interrogation for unrelated matters and to searches of their automobiles and of their person. Without question driving while texting is dangerous, but an additional risk not considered by most people is the effect of increased regulation further eroding our civil rights?"

Peter Johnson, General Partner of the Johnson & Johnson law firm in Walnut Creek, California.  Johnson’s firm has filed a lawsuit challenging California’s “Distracted Driving” law.  68,000 California drivers were issued citations for Distracted Driving last month alone.

May 29, 2012
"

Science is used to show that someone is in fact guilty when the reality of the situation is that science only suggests things may be a certain way. A systematic undertaking intended to develop knowledge that is anything but static is used to convince a group of non-practitioners of an absolute. The end result is a trump card in a game where lives are at stake.


Simplicity wins. Thoughtfulness loses. Science is more about questions than answers, but people inherently prefer answers to doubts. It’s hard to blame the jurors, though, as stupidity can be seductive. Easy answers ensure we’re all home for dinner. Except the defendant.

"

Tempe Criminal Defense Blog

h/t Simple Justice

May 28, 2012
The Rise And Fall Of The Fourth Amendment: A Case Study

Imagine, if you will, that you are David Holland.  You live in New York City.  It’s 1:40 a.m.  You’re walking down East 129th Street in Manhattan.  You’re in a poor part of town, near a housing project.  It’s late at night.  All of a sudden, you see four police officers turn the corner up ahead and start walking towards you.

What do you do?

David decided to turn around and start walking in the other direction.  In America, you’re allowed to do that.  You’re allowed to turn around and start walking the other direction when you see police.  You’re allowed to do it for a good, reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.  You’re even allowed to do it when you see a large group of police officers coming in your direction near a poor housing project in a “high crime area.”

Woops.  Just kidding.  You’re in a “high-crime area.”  Check your Constitutional rights at the door.

So one of the police officers (Officer Porras) asks David to “Stop!”  David stops.  Officer Porras asks David for identification.  David complies and gives his driver’s license to the officer.  After David hands his driver’s license over, Officer Porras asks him if he lives in the nearby public housing developement.  David says no.  Shortly thereafter, Officer Porras announces that he has no further questions for David, meaning he’s free to leave.  

But there’s one small problem: Officer Porras has refused to give David back his driver’s license.  So even though David is “technically” free to leave, he can’t very well leave without his driver’s license, which would serve as his primary means of identification should another police officer request his ID in the future.  So really, David is not free to leave in any meaningful sense.  Really, David is still being detained by the NYPD despite the fact that the officer who questioned him has expressly concluded his criminal investigation of David.  As of this moment, David has been detained illegally.

To wit, after Officer Porras informs David that his investigation is complete, a second Officer, Officer Woodard, approaches David and proceeds to ask him the exact same questions that Officer Porras asked him a moment earlier.  Officer Porras, still in possession of David’s driver’s license, says nothing, and allows Officer Woodard to continue asking David the same questions that Officer Porras has asked him mere seconds earlier.  There is no legitimate purpose to Woodard’s questioning.  Some might even refer to this as harassment.  But David is in a high-crime area, so nothing is true, and everything is permitted (which would be good if these officers were members of the Ancient Order of Masyaf Assassins.  Unfortunately, they are not).

As a result of the foregoing behavior by the NYPD, David becomes annoyed.  Perhaps because he’s already answered the first Officer’s questions.  Perhaps because they refused to give him his driver’s license back.  Perhaps because he’s discovered that these men are not members of the Ancient Order of Masyaf Assassins, which has depressed him greatly.  

Or perhaps it’s because David is asking himself a simple question: Why do I need to go through this again?  The police are clearly just harassing me at this point.  Aren’t I allowed to stick up for myself?  

So David decides to stick up for himself.  David makes it clear that he wants to leave.  He then tries to physically remove himself from the situation.  But he couldn’t, because “Officer Porr[a]s then assisted Woodard and [a third officer] in blocking defendant’s egress.”  So David decides that the police don’t have a right to do this to him, and pushes Officer Porras out of his way so he can leave.

You can imagine how well that worked out for David: David was shortly thereafter “restrained” by all four police officers, and was placed under arrest for assault and disorderly conduct.  During a search incident to arrest,  the officers discover marijuana and crack cocaine on David’s person, leading to drug possession charges as well.

During a pre-trial suppression hearing, David’s defense attorney files a motion to suppress the drugs found on his person, based on the fact that the police had illegally detained him, and therefore, all evidence detained against him is fruit of the poisonous tree, and ought to be suppressed.  Because David’s detention was illegal after officer Porras concluded his initial investigation, any evidence of drug activity found subsequent thereto was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, cannot be used against David in a court of law.

The trial judge, in this case, agrees with David’s defense attorney, explaining his ruling as follows:

[E]ven if there was a basis for initially requesting information from defendant, which there was not, any such justification was exhausted after he answered Porr[a]s who was obligated to return the identification and allow him to leave… .[David’s] continued detention” was unlawful, and [defendant’s reaction to it] was proportionate to the circumstances.

Huzzah!  The trial court did the right thing!  They suppressed evidence of criminal activity obtained by virtue of unconstitutional police practices!  Not only that, but he told David that he’s allowed to stand up for himself when police abuse their authority!  Strike up the band!  Let confetti rain in the streets!  The Constitution is back!

But lo’, the trial judge has done something dangerous.  He sided with a criminal defendant during a suppression hearing.  Even worse: the trial judge has employed a robust interpretation of the Fourth Amendment; one which protects criminal defendants from questionable police investigation practices.  The New York State Appellate Division (New York’s intermediate appellate court) knows better than to let that sort of malarky go unpunished:

[W]e disagree…that defendant’s “minimal use of force in the attempt to get away from the officers was a direct consequence of his unlawful detention.”  … [I]t is of no moment whether defendant punched or pushed Officer Porras, because, as stated above, the police officers did not initiate or attempt to initiate physical contact with defendant.

No, of course they didn’t.  The officers simply withheld an extremely important piece of property (i.e. his driver’s license) that David needs in order to meaningfully participate in society.  And ignoring the fact that the officers were violating his constitutional rights, I’m sure that David could have just politely asked for his driver’s license back and all would’ve been fine.  I’m sure David, being a poor resident of New York City, has never had a bad experience with the cops before.  Not even once.

So David did what many reasonable people would have done under the circumstances: he used physical force to escape a situation in which he was being detained illegally by overzealous police officers.  I say “overzealous” because I believe in giving police officers the benefit of the doubt.  Police work in big cities is tough.  And as Justice Breyer noted in a recent dissent, [T]he vast majority of fourth amendment violations … [are] motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable malice.”  So we’re not going to ascribe any bad faith to the officers.  We’ll assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the officers were performing there duties in good faith.

But even so; the drugs that were discovered on David’s person would never have been discovered if the police had not stopped David based on nothing other than the fact that David decided he didn’t want to be wherever four police officers were headed at 1:40am at night.  His behavior is also reasonable given the fact that David was in the vicinity of a housing project in a large city, where Constitutional rights tend to be optional.

Does any of this matter?  Nope.  The Appellate Division believed that, because David had the audacity to stand up for himself,  David deserved to have all evidence against him admitted during his criminal trial.  In the Appellate Division’s eyes, standing up for yourself means the fact that police were violating your constitutional rights is suddenly irrelevant.  To quote the Appellate Division:

[A]ny allegedly unlawful conduct in stopping and questioning defendant was attenuated by his calculated, aggressive and wholly distinct conduct.

Which is a fancy way of saying that you’re not allowed to stand up for yourself against cops who are abusing their authority if you have to use physical force to escape.  You have to sit there and take whatever abuse they’re putting you through.  If you use physical force, you run the risk of “attenuating” any unlawful conduct by the police, and thus rendering all illegally obtained evidence admissible against you in a court of law.

David appealed.  Perhaps the New York State Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) would help him!  Keep your hopes up, David!

Just kidding.  The New York State Court of Appeals is going to throw your case out by literally changing the definition of words:

Here, the Appellate Division’s reversal of Supreme Court’s order granting suppression, while termed “on the law,” was actually predicated upon a differing view concerning the issue of attenuation, which is a mixed question of law and fact. A reversal on a mixed question typically does not meet the requisites of CPL 450.90(2)(a)

But wait, what does CPL 450.90(2)(a) say?

[T]his Court may entertain an appeal from an order of an intermediate appellate court reversing an order of a criminal court only if it “determines that the intermediate appellate court’s determination of reversal … was on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to reversal.”

One judge, joined by a colleague, wrote a dissent.  He was a judge who’s valor and candor were so refreshing; his demeanor so impeccable; his legal acumen so beyond reproach, that he refused to be swayed by a majority of his colleagues on the NYS Court of Appeals.  That judge’s name?  Judge Lippman.  Chief judge of the New York State Court of Appeals.

What does judge Lippman think of the Appellate Division’s opinion?

[T]he Appellate Division simply concluded that any alleged illegality, no matter how extreme or provocative, must have been attenuated by defendant’s act of initiating physical contact with Officer Porras, even if that act consisted only of a push to get past the three officers illegally blocking his way. This was, in the end, not an attenuation analysis at all, but simply the announcement of an arbitrary rule that any physical contact with a police officer—no matter what its force or purpose—if not preceded by an attempt by the officer to contact the defendant, will be deemed distinct and unattributable to any precedent official illegality, no matter how provocative. Certainly, there is nothing in our cases that could be construed as permitting the substitution of such a rule for an attenuation analysis.

What about the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss David’s appeal due to lack of appellate jurisdiction?

Take it away, Lippman:

[By] pigeonholing this appeal as one involving a “mixed question,” the Court makes a choice that is not only unsound jurisdictionally, but erosive of this Court’s role in articulating the law governing police-civilian encounters.  The doctrine of attenuation in the search and seizure context is of course nothing more than a closely limited exception to the general, dominant rule that police intrusions must be justified at their inception…

If the exception is not to swallow the rule, care must be taken to assure that the doctrine is correctly employed. When courts with the factual jurisdiction to make attenuation findings employ facile analytic shortcuts operating to shield from judicial scrutiny illegal and possibly highly provocative police conduct, an issue of law is presented that is, I believe, this Court’s proper function to resolve.The alternative is to turn a blind eye to “tactics … [under which] any person might be approached, detained, intimidated, harassed, even provoked into a display of aggression and thereupon arrested, effectively eviscerating Fourth Amendment protections and ‘abandon[ing] the law-abiding citizen to the police officer’s whim or caprice’ [internal citations omitted].

Now wait a minute, Judge Lippman.  That seems like a bit of an exaggeration, don’t you think?

This is not an exaggerated or purely academic concern in a jurisdiction where, as is now a matter of public record, hundreds of thousands of pedestrian stops are performed annually by the police, only a very small percentage of which actually result in the discovery of evidence of crime.

Oh.  I see.

The final paragraph quoted above from Lippman’s dissent demonstrates why we should care when people like David lose their appeals.  David had marijuana and crack cocaine on him.  But not everyone who police stop has drugs on them.  In fact, the vast majority of people who the police stop do not have drugs on them.  By failing to protect David, we are also failing to protect every single person who might also be illegally obtained by police, but is not actually doing anything wrong. The police in this case harassed and provoked David, and as a result, were able to bust him for drugs.  But the police didn’t know that David had drugs on him when they were illegally obtaining him.  So by failing to protect David, we’re also failing to protect the hundreds of thousands of innocent people, most of them poor or disadvantaged in some way, who will have their rights violated by police engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” 

And that’s really what’s at stake: you don’t have to feel sorry for David.  But you do have to understand that it’s bad for everybody when people like David lose their case.  David’s case stands for an onerous proposition in New York: if police violate your constitutional rights, and you stand up for yourself, the police will not be punished for it in any way.  In fact, they will be rewarded by being able to get all evidence they illegally obtained from you, in violation of your Constitutional rights, admitted against you in a criminal trial.  

The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals of New York State have given police an incentive to antagonize and harass people on the street in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods, with the hopes that they will eventually lose their patience and try to escape from being illegally detained.  That’s not responsible law enforcement.  Nor is it the type of behavior that courts should be encouraging.

Unfortunately, this sort of thing is now commonplace.   Fourth Amendment case law in this country has calcified around an extremely law-enforcement friendly consensus.  Back in 1989, a survey of intermediate appellate courts in four state court systems found that your chances of winning a criminal appeal are laughably low:

[I]nstances in which a conviction or judgment were overturned and the case either remanded for a new trial or the charges dismissed were quite infrequent. Acquittals constituted only 1.9 percent of all appeals and only 9.4 percent of all nonaffirmances or “winners.” In no jurisdiction did acquittals occur in as many as 4 percent of all appeals.

Times have not changed much since then.  And the High Courts of each state aren’t doing much to correct the imbalance.  The NYS Court of Appeals recently patted itself on the back for increasing the number of criminal appeals it accepts to a whopping 5%(!) of cases.  And in those cases it does take, they “generally sid[e] with prosecutors more than with defense.”  

Many of these failed appeals are cases where the Defendant’s lawyer attempts to convince the intermediate appellate court that a trial court erred in admitting evidence which was obtained illegally.  But due in no small part to the Supreme Court’s 28-year war on the Exclusionary Rule, criminal defendants are worse off now, in virtually every jurisdiction, than they’ve ever been.

The point of all this?  Judicial oversight has consequences.  The legal rules they apply have consequences.  When judges don’t practice effective oversight of law enforcement officials that abuse their authority, or violate peoples’ constitutional rights, police no longer have incentives to avoid the kind of excesses they perpetrated against David Holland.  That’s what the Fourth Amendment is supposed to do: protect people from overreach and abuse by law enforcement.  But when we have appellate courts undermining trial judges in those few cases where they actually hold police accountable for their excesses, the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures becomes an empty promise. 

This is where we’re at right now.  And the Roberts Court shows no signs of slowing down.  A resilient majority of the Roberts Court has shown nothing but disdain for criminal defendants in the vast majority of their opinions.  Many of the Roberts Court’s most significant rulings: Hudson v. Michigan, Berghuis v. ThompkinsHerring v. United States, Kentucky v. King, Davis v. United States, Blueford v. Arkansas, every single one of these decisions reduced the amount of legal protection that criminal defendants have against police overreach.  Many state courts have followed suit, though some states have fought back against the tide of Fourth Amendment erosion by using state law to protect criminal defendants where the Fourth Amendment’s pronouncements now ring hollow.  Nonetheless, in most jurisdictions in this country, criminal defendants are at a significant disadvantage, and police are granted extraordinary license during criminal investigation, due in no small part to the reluctance of appellate courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court) to exercise meaningful judicial oversight of law enforcement officials whose questionable conduct led to the violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.

I wish I could say I was optimistic that something will change.  I don’t think it will, at least not in the short-term.  We have a resilient majority of so-called “Conservative” justices on the Supreme Court who view the Fourth Amendment as an inconvenient obstacle to effective law enforcement rather than a means by which to protect people from the overreaches of police.  They are more afraid of criminals going free than they are of peoples’ rights being violated by the police.  It is a jurisprudence of fear hedged on a fallacious idea that somehow, we are worse off if the Fourth Amendment prevents prosecutors from using evidence against you that is obtained by violating the Constitution.  This, however, is absurd, for reasons pointed out by Justice Day 90 years ago:

If letters and private documents can thus be [unlawfully] seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 

We are dangerously close to the last sentence.  But a majority of the Roberts Court seems not to care.  One can only hope that the words of Justice Brennan, dissenting 28 years ago in United States v. Leon, will ring true:

When the public, as it quite properly has done in the past as well as in the present, demands that those in government increase their efforts to combat crime, it is all too easy for those government officials to seek expedient solutions. In contrast to such costly and difficult measures as building more prisons, improving law enforcement methods, or hiring more prosecutors and judges to relieve the overburdened court systems in the country’s metropolitan areas, the relaxation of Fourth Amendment standards seems a tempting, costless means of meeting the public’s demand for better law enforcement. In the long run, however, we as a society pay a heavy price for such expediency, because, as Justice Jackson observed, the rights guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment ”are not mere second-class rights, but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Once lost, such rights are difficult to recover. There is hope, however, that in time this or some later Court will restore these precious freedoms to their rightful place as a primary protection for our citizens against overreaching officialdom.


May 26, 2012
Double Jeopardy Bonus Round (Capital Murder Edition!)

This week, the Supreme Court decided in a 6-3 decision, Blueford v. Arkansas,  that if you are charged with multiple crimes, and a unanimous jury finds you not guilty of one charge, but fails to reach a verdict on others (resulting in a mistrial), you may be retried on all charges, period.  Including the one that you were unanimously found not guilty of by the original jury.  You know, the one who tried you.  The first time.

“But Wait!” You exclaim with wild abandon, legs akimbo and arms atwitter.  ”Doesn’t the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevent you from being tried twice for the same offense?”

Oh yeah.  That old thing?  

According to the Roberts court, the declaration of a mistrial by the trial judge has the magical effect of nullifying the fact that 12 jurors found you not guilty of an independently chargeable crime, so long as the trial judge fails to issue a final judgment of acquittal.  The jury foreperson’s report indicating a unanimous verdict on the Capital murder and First degree murder charges?  Hogwash!:

The foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of anything.  When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded.  The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, even after the foreperson had delivered her report.  When they emerged a half hour later, the foreperson stated only that they were unable to reach a verdict.  She gave no indication whether it was still the case that all 12 jurors believed Blueford was not guilty of capital or first-degree murder, that 9 of them believed he was guilty of manslaughter, or that a vote had not been taken on negligent homicide.  The fact that deliberations continued after the report deprives that report of the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on the murder offenses.

This (in my humble opinion) is a complete mischaracterization of the trial record.  They even quoted from the damn record earlier in the opinion:

THE COURT: All right.  If you have your numbers together, and I don’t want names, but if you have your numbers I would like to know what your count was on capital murder. 

“JUROR NUMBER ONE: That was unanimous against that.  No. 

“THE COURT: Okay, on murder in the first degree?

“JUROR NUMBER ONE: That was unanimous against that. 

“THE COURT: Okay.  Manslaughter?

“JUROR NUMBER ONE: Nine for, three against. 

“THE COURT: Okay.  And negligent homicide?

“JUROR NUMBER ONE: We did not vote on that, sir. 

“THE COURT: Did not vote on that. 

“JUROR NUMBER ONE: No, sir.  We couldn’t get past the manslaughter.  Were we supposed to go past that? I thought we were supposed to go one at a time.”  Id., at 64–65.

After this exchange, the trial judge issued what’s known as an Allen instruction, which essentially amounts to the trial judge telling the jurors to “give it the ole’ college try,” and go back to the jury room and attempt to reach a verdict on all charges.  They did so, but the jury returned and told the trial judge that they had failed to reach a unanimous verdict on all charges.  The trial judge then declared a mistrial, and the State of Arkansas attempted to retry Blueford.  

During the new proceedings, Blueford’s lawyer filed a motion to dismiss his capital and first degree murder charges on the grounds that a jury of his peers had already unanimously voted to acquit him on those charges.  The trial judge denied the motion.  Blueford’s lawyer then filed what’s known as an interlocutory appeal, which is an appeal taken from an adverse ruling by a trial court before the trial is completed (in most cases, you can’t appeal adverse rulings on questions of law until the trial is complete.  But in some cases, an adverse ruling from a trial judge is immediately appealable.  When that happenes, it’s known as an interlocutory appeal).  

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and Blueford then filed what is known as a petition for writ of certiorari, which is essentially a request to have your case reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court granted the writ (often referred to as “granted certiorari” or “granting certification”), and issued this haberdasher of an opinion.

The 6-3 majority in this opinion is essentially saying that Blueford can be retried because the jurors could have had a change of heart on the issues they had already decided unanimously when they went back to deliberate the other charges.  In other words, one of the central building blocks in the majority’s opinion is based on nothing short of naked conjecture about the jury’s intentions.  The Supreme Court has placed an entire class of criminal defendants outside the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause on the basis of pure speculation.  

Three justices dissented, of course.  Justice Sotomayor (or as we may call her more appropriately in this instance, la voz de la razón), tries to spell it out as plainly as possible:

The bar on retrials following acquittals is “the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence”… .  In ascertaining whether an acquittal has occurred, “form is not to be exalted over substance.”  Sanabria v. United States, 437 U. S. 54, 66 (1978).  Rather, we ask whether the factfinder has made “a substantive determination that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden.” Smith v.  Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462, 468 (2005)… .  Jeopardy terminates upon a determination, however characterized, that the “evidence is insufficient” to prove a defendant’s “factual guilt.”  Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144 (1986). Thus, we have treated as acquittals a trial judge’s directed verdict of not guilty, Smith, 543 U. S., at 468; an appellate reversal of a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence,  Burks, 437 U. S., at 10; and, most pertinent here, a jury’s announcement of a not guilty verdict that was “not followed by any judgment,”  Ball, 163 U. S., at 671.

The quibble of the Majority in this case would be that because a verdict was not reached on all questions, a verdict was not reached period.  But to reach that conclusion would be to do precisely what Sanabria v. United States forbids: exalting form over substance.  The only counter-argument to this is, that the jury could have changed its mind after the Allen instruction was issued.  But that’s an argument based quite literally on ignorance: the foreperson didn’t say whether they were still unanimous on the first two charges.  And why would they?  The trial court didn’t ask them for that information before declaring a mistrial.  So again, we are back to pure speculation: the Roberts Court has removed an entire class of criminal defendants from the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause based on jurisprudential guesswork.

Blueford may be found not guilty of the Capital murder and First-degree murder charges by a new jury.  Or he may not.  The point is that this is precisely the sort of situation that the Double Jeopardy clause is supposed to prevent.  But perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised: the Roberts Court never did care much for preserving a Constitutional right that a criminal might possibly benefit from.  Of course, Blueford might not be a criminal.  But he could be.  That’s close enough.

May 26, 2012
Race, Crime, And Statistics (Long Post)

A reader asks:

In your recent posts regarding the racial disparity in conviction rates, you dismiss using conviction statistics as a proxy for knowing who is committing crime. However, you haven’t made the counter-argument — you simply assume that all races commit crimes at the same rates, and show how a racial bias could produce unequal conviction rates, but that’s begging the question. Do you have any data supporting that assumption?

I would be happy to provide you with data.  

Read More

May 25, 2012
Why Criminal Defense Lawyers Get Pissed Off

Ken at Popehat provides a textbook example of why many of us in the criminal defense racket think the warrant process is a joke (disclosure: I am still a law student, not a practicing attorney):

Witness tells Cop that she saw a photo of guns in Defendant’s house a year ago, and thinks she saw guns there at one point more than a year ago.

Cop tells judge, in warrant application, that Witness says that Defendant is currently an arms trafficker. It is undisputed that Witness did not say that — that Witness did not say a blessed thing about Defendant selling or transferring guns.

Judge issues warrant.

We challenge warrant.

Reviewing judge says that Cop’s statement — that Witness said Defendant was engaged in arms trafficking— is just an “exaggeration,” not a false statement vitiating the warrant.

That. That right there. That’s what it is like.

I’d be interested to know if the warrant in this case was signed by one of those fancy ‘didn’t even go to law school’ magistrates, who may or may not have had any substantial legal training sufficient to develop a nuanced understanding of what probable cause even is, or a nuanced understanding of the Fourth Amendment, or a nuanced understanding of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, or a nuanced understanding of how Illinois v. Gates modified it, or a nuanced understanding of what the difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion is, or a nuanced understanding of how to apply Kentucky v. King’s holding to cases involving police-created exigent circumstances (hint: nobody really knows, although Orin Kerr thinks he does).

But in the back of our imagination, we like to hope and pray that we can expect better from a judge, who at least theoretically has legal training as a lawyer (in many smaller jurisdictions they often don’t), and who hopefully has a nuanced understanding of what “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment actually means, and how to apply it in a pre-trial suppression hearing where a warrant (or the absence thereof) is being challenged.

Nope.  What we get is a judge telling us that when a witness does not say something, and the prosecution does not dispute that the witness didn’t say something, and that thing just so happens to be that special something which gave police probable cause to secure a warrant, and without that special something, there’d be no probable cause, and no suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore no warrant, no search, and consequently no arrest; when that happens, it’s  baaaasically the same as if the witness had said the thing everybody agrees he didn’t say.  It’s close enough.

And that’s why we get upset.

May 25, 2012
How To Look Like An Idiot By Using Conviction Statistics

From a 2008 post at Simple Justice, Scott Greenfield takes a commenter to task for defending Paul Cassell’s absurd claim that Blacks are disproportionately imprisoned because Blacks simply commit more crimes than Whites.  The commenter references FBI UCR statistics:

…Access the FBI uniform crime reporting program on their website. You can wade thru the stats or cut to the chase and just go to table 43, arrests by race, 2005 (last year of stats ). These corrolate with the DOJ victim stats. For instance, blacks make up approx. 13% of the U.S. population. In 2005 they made up 56% of the robbery suspects. 


..We don’t get to make up the facts, just our opinions, and it’s not racist if it’s fact. Based on what the facts are, as contained in DOJ and FBI stats, and my own personal experience, black folk, mainly menfolk, commit a higher frequency of crime than other ethnic groups or races. Much higher. If you have any evidence that I’m wrong in my belief, bring it out or referrence it, I’d like to see it. I’m willing to change my opinion if the facts have changed, or I read them wrongly. But I’m not willing to substitute my emotion for my intellect.

What’s the problem with using these statistics as proof that Blacks commit more crimes than Whites?  As Greenfield notes, conviction rates have almost zero relevance to who is actually committing crimes:

The stats do not show who commits crimes.  They show who are arrested, prosecuted and convicted for crimes.  The breakdowns don’t account for variables.  If blacks and whites live in the same upper middle class neighborhood, do they still commit 56% of the crimes?  If not, then you eliminate the variable of black from propensity and are left with poverty.  If the lives and circumstances of whites and blacks were reversed today, then the stats would be the opposite because race plays no role in propensity to commit crime.  

Blacks are disproportionately in prison because they are disproportionately investigated, arrested, and sentenced to prison for behavior that all races manifest in equal measure.  As I explained in November:

Imagine you have two groups of individuals: call them A and B.  Let us assume that both Group A and B participate in behavior that is punishable as a crime at equal rates.

Now let us imagine that the police are allowed wide discretion in whom they investigate for crime.  Obviously, if the police decide to pay closer attention to one group rather than the other, they will discover more crimes within that group, and thus, make more arrests.  But remember that both Group A and B participate in behavior punishable as crime at roughly equivalent rates.  Yet because the police pay extra-close attention to Group B, more of Group B’s members end up in jail.  This gives people the impression that members of Group B are more likely to be criminals, even thought Group A participates in illegal behavior at the same rate as Group B.

If all races were investigated, convicted, and sentenced to prison at the same rate that Blacks in America are today, the criminal justice system would grind to a halt underneath the weight of its own “efficiency.”  Critical race scholars in legal academia have been screaming about this for years, but the inequities in our system continue unabated; in part because hacks like Paul Cassell, a former U.S. District Court judge, Supreme Court law clerk, and current professor of Law at Utah, continue to lend legitimacy to these theories by offering up statistics with zero critical analysis.

May 25, 2012
This Is Your War On Drugs: Civil Asset Forfeiture Addition

Turley reports on Tennessee’s new “Policing for Profit” program:

A professional insurance adjuster, George Reby, was traveling through the state from New Jersey when he was stopped and asked by Officer Larry Bates if he had large amounts of cash. He said that he did — $22,000. The officer demanded the money and said that he was confiscating the money on suspicion of drug activity. That is it. The mere fact that he was carrying a large amount of cash was enough under this policy to seize the money. The police know that many out-of-state travelers never come back for the cash and they are then allowed to keep the money for their own uses at the department.

Even though Reby explained why he had the money, it did not matter. The fact that he completely cooperated in allowing a full search of his car did not matter. What mattered was that the police wanted the cash.

We are then treated to the officer’s flippant and completely irrelevant remarks about bank accounts:

Bates admitted that he did not arrest Reby because he did not commit any crime. However, he reminded drivers that “[t]he safest place to put your money if it’s legitimate is in a bank account. He stated he had two. I would put it in a bank account. It draws interest and it’s safer.”

Whether or not it is safe to keep large amounts of money in a bank account, or on one’s person, is of course completely irrelevant to whether that money should be seized by a law enforcement official pursuant to suspicion of drug activity.  Of course, who cares whether you’re suspected of drug activity when State law presumes you are guilty until proven innocent:

Bates said that he was right to take the money because “he couldn’t prove it was legitimate.” That of course flips the normal presumption under criminal law, but it is an example of how police powers have increased in this country.

To made matters even more authoritarian, Tennessee law allows a judge to sign off on the seizure in an ex parte proceeding. Reby was never informed of the hearing. Only the officer’s account is considered at such hearings.

So it’s bad.  Still, if you do have the evidence to prove that you have a legitimate reason for carrying that much cash, you can get the money back, right?

Sure.  But that assumes that the police and/or prosecutors are going to report your ability to prove your innocence to the Court:

While Reby insists that he offered to show proof on his computer as to the source of the money, the offer was not reported to the court. Bates simply stated “common people do not carry this much U.S. currency.” He noted later that “a thousand-dollar bundle could approximately buy two ounces of cocaine.” Of course, ten dollars can buy drugs as well as a thousand dollars can buy a jet ski.

In our country, the concept of Due Process is premised on the assumption of Adversarialism.  Our theory of justice stipulates that when two interested parties litigate a dispute against one another, their mutual desire to achieve a good result will motivate them to vigorously argue, research and present their case, the consequence of which is that all legal theories and evidence are presented to a disinterested arbiter (the Court), who will then make a decision based on the law and the facts presented.  

Yet Adversarialism requires…adversaries.  That is the problem with these Ex Parte civil forfeiture proceedings.  The defendant whose money has been seized has no opportunity to present a defense, even in cases where they cooperate completely with law enforcement, and are highly willing and able to present evidence that demonstrates a legitimate reason for being in possession of large sums of money.

George Reby did finally get his money back.  But he’s exceptional in that regard.  As Turley notes, “It takes months for travelers to get their money back and many give up. In Reby’s case, he was forced to travel back to Tennessee to pick up the check and was given no apology for the abusive seizure.”

It would be trivially easy to change this policy.  You could start by requiring that law enforcement officials, as a matter of law, cannot seize property unless they have probable cause to suspect that a detained person is involved in criminal activity.  You could also, as Turley notes, “stipulate that police and prosecutors cannot benefit from seizures — removing the incentive for broad seizures.”  You could also impose a statute of limitations on prosecutors: a probable cause hearing must be held within 30 days demonstrating facts sufficient to justify the seizure, including corroborating evidence that the money was being used for criminal activity.  

And while we’re at it, we can recognize these types of forfeitures for what they are: a deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of peoples’ 14th Amendment rights.  To call what happened to George Reby “Due Process” is a mockery of the term.  We have an Adversarial system.  It’s hardly Due Process when one of the adversaries isn’t present during the proceedings in which his property is taken from him.

May 17, 2012
"[A]rrest is not the inevitable consequence of law-breaking; this is most acutely true in the proactive policing context. There, enforcement opportunities far exceed enforcement resources and [police] departments have substantial discretion to selectively apply those resources. Because this is true, evaluating whether a police department employs its arrest discretion justly is not reducible to the question of whether each individual arrest is carried out lawfully. In contrast to the dominant theories of criminal punishment, distributive justice focuses on whether institutional policies spread costs and benefits across a heterogeneous citizenry in an egalitarian manner."

— Nirej S. Sikhon, Redistributive Policing101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1171, 1212 (2011).

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