February 10, 2012
Rand, Nietzsche, And Marx, Ctd.

After my most recent post on Ayn Rand’s Nietzschean and Marxist underpinnings, bbcity, much to my happiness, issued a fuller critique of my argument. For the time being, I’d like to mop up a couple tertiary, semantic issues while leaving the core issues (the relationship between Rand, Nietzsche and/or Marx) to a future post somewhere down the road.

First, I pointed out to bbcity after our exchange that I disagreed with her analysis; partially because her follow-up response still feels unconvincing to me (much of her substantive criticism of my argument is an attack on the credibility of my sources, which, with all due respect, is just an argumentum ad verecundiam).  But after looking through some of bbcity’s writing, it’s quite clear to me that she’s arguing ad verecundiam because she has studied the shit out of Nietzsche, and this being Tumblr, most of us don’t have time to whip together a laundry list of tracts and papers that will demonstrate the weakness of an opponent’s argument (particular where, as bbcity mentioned, she’s been at it for awhile).  In that sense, the burden is of course, on me to find and address those sources, and I hope to do so at a later date, so we can continue our discourse.

Along the same lines, I also want to point my readers to an excellent follow-up response from Interruptions, who feels that any connection between Rand and Marx is based off a strained and superficial reading of Rand, and that I’ve failed to make myself clear by vacillating between two points on the continuum between similarity and difference.  It’s a fair point, and I hope to clarify this issue in the future as well.

There is one small bit of housekeeping I want to address presently: bbcity mentioned at the end of her post that I misused the term “axiom,” because dialectical materialism does not have axioms; it is relational, rather than causal.

Respectfully, I disagree: if for no other reason than the adherents of dialectical materialism regularly use the language of axioms to explain how dialectical materialism works (see below).

Now there’s no question that dialectical materialism is relational: it has as it’s basis, inter alia, the tension between inherent contradictions within objects.  I think Alex Callinicos offers us a nice summary of the nature of this relational dynamic in his review of The Algebra of Revolution:

The essence of dialectical thinking consists in the recognition that antagonism, conflict and struggle are not a secondary aspect of reality which can be removed through a bit of social engineering or the decision of rival classes to fall in love and become ‘partners’. ‘Contradiction is at the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity,’ says Hegel.2 He understood this thesis primarily in terms of the contradictions which develop within concepts: the evolution of nature and human history are an expression of this conceptual dialectic.

What is important to understand about the dialectic, however, is that it is a science, i.e. a form of observing the world and attaining knowledge (see Callinicos at the above link for a more fleshed-out definition).   In this sense, the dialectic, much like any other analytical system, starts from it’s own axiom: namely, that the world is in constant motion.  I hope bbcity will accept Trotsky as a credible authority on the subject.  From The ABC of Dialectical Materialism:

Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice including techniques. For concepts there also exits “tolerance” which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom ‘A’ is equal to ‘A’, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. “Common sense” is characterised by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical “tolerance”.

And here’s Ted Grant et al., from pg. 39 of Reason in Revolt: Dialectical Philosophy and Modern Science:

Dialectics is a method of thinking and interpreting the world of both nature and society.  It is a way of looking at the universe, which sets out from the axiom that everything is in a constant state of change and flux.

Along similar lines, here is Slavoj Zizek making passing reference to the axioms of “materialist dialectics,” while discussing Badiou’s Logiques Des Mondes:

Alain Badiou provides a succinct definition of “democratic materialism” and its opposite, “materialist dialectics”: the axiom which condenses the first one is “There is nothing but bodies and languages …,” to which materialist dialectics adds “… with the exception of truths.”

Now it seems fairly clear to me that either Trotsky, Grant, Zizek (and I) are misusing the term “axiom,” or dialectical materialism does in fact have axioms.  Either way, I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on the matter; Marx and Engels were a large part of my course of study in undergrad (political science w/ concentration in political theory), and I’d be rather shocked to discover that my understanding of dialectical materialism was essentially based on a misnomer about the definition of what an axiom is.

By the way, anyone who’s interested in Marxism should check out bbcity’s fantastic post defending the LTV, in which she rolls out J. Roemer’s substantive critique of wage dynamics.  Excellent discussion.

February 9, 2012
Ayn Rand, Nietzsche, And Marx Walk Into A Bar…

I appear to have struck a nerve with bbcity, whose judicious use of caps lock afflicts his her prose with a most profound and delicate flavor in his her well-argued, 1-paragraph essay responding to my previous post about Ayn Rand:

OBJECTIVISM HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH EITHER DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM NOR THE NIETZSCHEAN UBERMENSCH MOTIF AND WHOEVER WROTE THIS DESERVES ALL PHILOSOPHICAL CREDIBILITY STRIPPED FROM THEIR PERSON IMMEDIATELY.

I am clearly outmatched.

First off, there are indeed many folks who feel that the link between Ayn Rand and Nietzsche is non-existent. For the sake of brevity, let’s focus on Brian Leiter, a severe scholar of Nietzsche’s work. His somewhat-more-robust refutation reveals what I believe to be the flaws in the counter-Nietzschean narrative with respect to Ayn Rand:

Rand’s “individualism”—if that is what one wants to call her juvenile fantasies about her industrialist heroes—owes as little to Nietzsche as to Smith.  Nietzsche loathed capitalism and capitalists (and the cultural and aesthetic vulgarity he saw as their legacy) and also despised what he called “the selfishness of the sick” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) and the “self-interested cattle and mob” (Will to Power).  What he admired was “severe self-love,” the kind “most profoundly necessary for growth” (Ecce Homo).  “Virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality”—all the things “for whose sake it is worthwhile to live on earth” (Beyond Good and Evil)—all demand such severe self-love, and for this reason, and this reason only, Nietzsche wanted to disabuse those capable of such excellences of their false consciousness about the morality of altruism.  He certainly did not think everyone ought to be selfish, or that the pursuit of material goods had any value, or that indulgence of selfish desires was a virtue.  What he did think is what is almost certainly true:  namely, that if someone like Beethoven had taken Christian morality seriously, and lived a Christian life, he would not have accomplished what the actual Beethoven did (one need only read the famous Maynard Solomon biography to see that Beethoven was no moral saint).  The “John Galts” of the world are just a more prosperous example of the “self-interested cattle and mob” Nietzsche always derided.

Needless to say, Nietzsche also did not share Rand’s sophomoric views about rationality and objectivity, but that is not usually where superficial readers find the putative link.  And as to the Übermenschen, I refer the interested reader to an earlier discussion

Here, Leiter is clearly using the space in-between the emphasized text to argue that, while Nietzsche’s means may be similar to Rand’s, his philosophical ends were much different.  Hell, even the means were different (i.e. Rand’s rationality and objectivity).  And of course, Leiter believes that the Ubermensch motif is not intended to be a pathology of selfishness and anti-altruism, making it an ill-fitting foundation for Rand’s Galtian Superman.

But the problem with Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche is that he’s cherry-picking the pieces of Nietzsche’s work that support his thesis and ignoring the pieces that do not.  Let’s start by pointing out the fact that Nietzsche, in an otherwise noble exaltation of the liberty interests associated with voluntary suicide, called for the affirmative euthanization of invalids:

The invalid is a parasite on society. In a certain state it is indecent to go on living….The highest interest of life, of ascending life, demands the most ruthless suppression and sequestration of degenerating life — for example in determining the right to reproduce, the right to be born, the right to live…. To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death of one’s own free choice, death at the proper time, with a clear head and with joyfulness, consummated in the midst of children and witnesses. 

And then there’s this observation from The Anti-Christ:

What is good? — All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is happiness? — The feeling that power increases. 

In light of this, I am with David Conway at Middlesex University (from the link above):

So far as the suffering of the weak and unhealthy is concerned, as I read Nietzsche, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate for one of the strong and healthy to respond to a knowledge of this suffering in others by denial of the will. For, if strong and healthy are constitutionally as such immune to suffering in their own case, why should the fact that others suffer be of any concern to them? It is a fact that the strong can acknowledge, but without any real emotional import.

In other words: to the extent that Nietzsche’s philosophy was not a call against altruism, it was oddly constructed to achieve that result, because Nietzsche’s philosophy called for a complete lack of concern with those less well-endowed to live a “proud” life.  Compare this to Rand’s vicarious commentary via Howard Roark in The Fountainhead:

The man who attempts to live for others is…a parasite in motive and makes parasites of those he serves. The relationship produces nothing but mutual corruption. It is impossible in concept. The nearest approach to it in reality - the man who lives to serve others - is the slave. If physical slavery is repulsive, how much more repulsive is the concept of servility of the spirit?

On the question of Altruism, then, the difference is one of degree: Nietzsche called for apathy, whereas Rand sought an affirmative duty to abstain from altruism.  And to the extent that Nietzsche was apathetic, he extended an affirmative duty to euthanize the mentally retarded and physically disabled.  Leiter’s interpretation is simply not coherent when couched against other pieces of Nietzsche’s writing.

Finally, with respect to Dialectical Materialism, I of course agree that Dialectical Materialism and Objectivism are quite different philosophies.  But the point that was made by Whittaker Chambers, and which I make again here, is that her philosophy was, at the end of the day, just a different flavor of philosophical materialism.  The focus here is not on Godlessness per se (as implied by this follow-up commenter’s compelling argument against my original claim); the focus is on the fundamental axioms at play.  Since bbcity used caps in his her response, I’ll accept the invitation to make my argument as clear as I can:

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY THAT RAND SPENT HER ENTIRE LIFE FIGHTING; BUT HER PRIMARY ERROR WAS THE FACT THAT SHE STARTED FROM THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS AS HER ADVERSARIES, AND THEREBY CREATED AN IDEOLOGY THAT WAS NOTHING BUT A POLARIZED VERSION OF LENINIST BOLSHEVISM AND IT’S DIALECTIC MATERIALIST ROOTS.

Dialectical Materialism starts from the assumption that all economic systems move towards maximum efficiency while simultaneously developing internal contradictions that lead to their systemic decay.  Lenin, Rand’s arch-nemesis, made his own contributions to the field when he published Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.  To the extent that Lenin’s Marxist-Hegelian roots materialized as political Bolshevism, his writing demonstrates rather vividly that he was motivated in no small part by Marxist-Hegelian Dialectics.  And it was precisely Lenin’s political Bolshevism that Rand was reacting so violently to, because she was traumatized by it as a child.  On this matter, I would direct one’s attention to this phenomenal article written by Johann Hari in 2009 about Ayn Rand’s childhood, her rise to infamy, and the two-faced nature of her damaged philosophy:

Rand was broken by the Bolsheviks as a girl, and she never left their bootprint behind. She believed her philosophy was Bolshevism’s opposite, when in reality it was its twin. Both she and the Soviets insisted a small revolutionary elite in possession of absolute rationality must seize power and impose its vision on a malleable, imbecilic mass. The only difference was that Lenin thought the parasites to be stomped on were the rich, while Rand thought they were the poor.

For good measure, Hari also mentions the Nietzschean underpinnings of Rand’s work:

Her diaries from that time, while she worked as a receptionist and an extra, lay out the Nietzschean mentality that underpins all her later writings. The newspapers were filled for months with stories about serial killer called William Hickman, who kidnapped a 12-year-old girl called Marion Parker from her junior high school, raped her, and dismembered her body, which he sent mockingly to the police in pieces. Rand wrote great stretches of praise for him, saying he represented “the amazing picture of a man with no regard whatsoever for all that a society holds sacred, and with a consciousness all his own. A man who really stands alone, in action and in soul. … Other people do not exist for him, and he does not see why they should.” She called him “a brilliant, unusual, exceptional boy,” shimmering with “immense, explicit egotism.” Rand had only one regret: “A strong man can eventually trample society under its feet. That boy [Hickman] was not strong enough.”

With all this being said, I want to make one thing clear: there are clearly incongruities between Rand’s work and Nietzsche’s.  Leiter is absolutely right that Nietzsche and Rand had different philosophical goals; Rand’s work is rightfully viewed as a corruption of, and not an heir to, Nietzsche’s work (the story of the 12-year old boy above demonstrates Rand’s corruption of the Nietzschean ethic quite readily, I think).  

But to claim that Rand was not influenced by Nietzsche’s philosophy in any way (i.e. they “have nothing to do” with each other) is, I respectfully submit, insane.  And with respect to the link between Rand’s philosophical materialism and the dialectical materialism foundations of her Bolshevist adversaries, I submit that the similarities are simply too large and too obvious to ignore.  There are not a few writers who have picked up on the similarities between Rand and her ideological adversaries, and plenty of “credible” academic observers have come to the same conclusion.

In my experience, people who reject the connection between Rand and Nietzsche do so out of their disgust for Rand and their respect for Nietzsche.  I share both sentiments; Rand was a hack and Nietzsche had a lot of valid insights.  But to disavow any and all connection between Rand and Nietzsche is irreconcilable in light of their writings and motivations.  The influence is palpable, and there’s plenty of textual support for it.  Whether one chooses to ignore it is their own prerogative.

February 8, 2012
On Ayn Rand

As I spotted JoeMcCarthyBlues discussing Ayn Rand with spry interlocutors, I was reminded of an article that Whittaker Chambers wrote for National Review in 1957, in which he essentially decimated Ayn Rand’s philosophy and literary bona fides.  It is worth quoting Chambers at length.  Here, he analyzes Rand’s use of the dollar sign as a symbol of her liberation ideology, one which, in the end, is simply Marxism turned inside out:

[Ayn Rand’s] Dollar Sign is not merely provocative, though we sense a sophomoric intent to raise the pious hair on susceptible heads. More importantly, it is meant to seal the fact that mankind is ready to submit abjectly to an elite of technocrats, and their accessories, in a New Order, enlightened and instructed by Miss Rand’s ideas that the good life is one which “has resolved personal worth into exchange value,” “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash-payment.’” The author is explicit, in fact deafening, about these prerequisites. Lest you should be in any doubt after 1168 pages, she assures you with a final stamp of the foot in a postscript: “And I mean it.” But the words quoted above are those of Karl Marx. He, too, admired “naked self-interest” (in its time and place), and for much the same reasons as Miss Rand: because, he believed, it cleared away the cobwebs of religion and led to prodigies of industrial and cognate accomplishment.

The overlap is not as incongruous as it looks. Atlas Shrugged can be called a novel only by devaluing the term. It is a massive tract for the times. Its story merely serves Miss Rand to get the customers inside the tent, and as a soapbox for delivering her Message. The Message is the thing. It is, in sum, a forthright philosophic materialism. Upperclassmen might incline to sniff and say that the author has, with vast effort, contrived a simple materialist system, one, intellectually, at about the stage of the oxcart, though without mastering the principle of the wheel. Like any consistent materialism, this one begins by rejecting God, religion, original sin, etc. etc. (This book’s aggressive atheism and rather unbuttoned “higher morality,” which chiefly outrage some readers, are, in fact, secondary ripples, and result inevitably from its underpinning premises.) Thus, Randian Man, like Marxian Man, is made the center of a godless world. 

I quote this simply to remind people that even conservative contemporaries of Rand did not like her.  They appreciated her anti-government stance, but conservatism was traditionally, above all things, an ideology of homeostasis.  Rand was essentially calling for social upheaval and revolution; which are two things that traditional conservatism opposes because existing political systems and traditions often serve invisible needs that are undetectable by external reformers.  Hence the reason why, e.g., Edmund Burke was critical of the French Revolution (whose controversial, bloody aftermath vindicated him).

With that said, I am in 100% agreement with Chambers’ critique: Rand was scarred by Communism when she was young, and as a result, developed a political ideology that was so superlative in its elevation of opposing principles that her philosophy essentially occupied the opposite side of the same coin.  Objectivism is essentially dialectical materialism and LTV (“are you not entitled to the sweat of your brow?”) dressed up in private property rights and Nietzchean ubermensch pathology.

November 29, 2011
Would Ayn Rand Support Financial Regulation?

Bruce Judson argues yes:

…[T]he prevailing ethos in America has been that rich people deserve their wealth because they have created societal value for all of us. Indeed, I suspect the vast majority of the American people do not begrudge the wealth earned by successful, risk-taking innovators like Michael Dell, Jeff Bezos, the late Steve Jobs, or Ross Perot.

This leads to the conclusion that Rand’s philosophy is only anti-regulation because it is ultra-supportive of the capitalist ideal: The people who create the most societal wealth should receive the benefits of this contribution.

From this perspective, Rand’s philosophy points out that real capitalism is no longer enforced in America; not because of welfare programs, taxes, the social safety net, or government regulations, but for a very different reason: The highest paid people in America today create no real wealth for the society.

Judson continues:

…Ayn Rand would, I believe, argue that this absolute failure to enforce capitalist principles is exactly what she most feared: The emergence of a powerful group that produces nothing, yet manages to takes a large share of the societal wealth created by others. In her view, this inevitably leads a society to implode and self-destruct.

And a final thought:

In Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, the industrialists who create the real wealth of the society start to disappear as they go into hiding. The trains that make the society work, both literally and metaphorically, stop.

So I have developed what we can call the Ayn Rand test of value: If securities traders and quants at investment firms and hedge funds started to disappear in large numbers tomorrow, would the trains that comprise our economy and society run better or worse?

You should read the entire post, because there’s a lot that’s missing from these snippets.  But I want to focus on Judson’s thought experiment (bolded above) which I believe is flawed for the same reason Ayn Rand’s entire body of philosophy is flawed (which includes the naive caricatures of humanity she creates in her novels).  It is based on an extreme over-simplification of reality. 

Judson is encouraging us to consider what the actual value of investment banking is.  And to be frank, I disagree with the implication that all investments and securities markets are suspect.  I suspect that the world would in fact come to a crashing halt if our largest investment banking institutions suddenly decided to “opt-out.”  Indeed, I fail to see how these institutions could ever be “too big to fail” if that weren’t the case.    

At the end of the day, we need to get back to fundamentals: if we speak of Randian regulations, we can safely assume that the simpler they are, the better.  In that sense, Glass-Steagall remains the preferred option.  It was the repeal of Glass-Steagall that allowed financial firms to become so big in the first place, by combining deposit holdings with securities issuance, and all that entails.

Investment banks, by themselves, are ok.  They serve a purpose in Capitalist economies. The problem comes when Investment banks are allowed to use the rights and privileges of deposit-holding institutions to under-write inflated risk exposure in derivatives markets.  By combining the two, you virtually guarantee the creation of firms that are too big to fail.

In short: Investment banking isn’t existentially suspect.  It has a role in Capitalist societies.  Allowing investment banks to under-write their investments by using the rights and privileges designed for deposit-holding institutions, however, is suspect.  The answer is not for Wall Street to go Galt.  It’s for Washington to go Steagall.  Glass-Steagall.

September 24, 2011
"As a defense against the Witch-doctory of Hegel, who claimed universal omniscience, the scientist was offered the combined neo-mystic Witch-doctory and Attila-ism of the Logical Positivists. They assured him that such concepts as metaphysics or existence or reality or thing or matter or mind are meaningless—let the mystics care whether they exist or not, a scientist does not have to know it; the task of theoretical science is the manipulation of symbols, and scientists are the special elite whose symbols have the magic power of making reality conform to their will (“matter is that which fits mathematical equations”). Knowledge, they said, consists, not of facts, but of words, words unrelated to objects, words of an arbitrary social convention, as an irreducible primary; thus knowledge is merely a matter of manipulating language. The job of scientists, they said, is not the study of reality, but the creation of arbitrary constructs by means of arbitrary sounds, and any construct is as valid as another, since the criterion of validity is only “convenience” and the definition of science is “that which the scientists do.” But this omnipotent power, surpassing the dreams of ancient numerologists or of medieval alchemists, was granted to the scientist by philosophical Attila-ism on two conditions: a. that he never claim certainty for his knowledge, since certainty is unknown to man, and that he claim, instead, “percentages of probability,” not troubling himself with such questions as how one calculates percentages of the unknowable; b. that he claim as absolute knowledge the proposition that all values lie outside the sphere of science, that reason is impotent to deal with morality, that moral values are a matter of subjective choice, dictated by one’s feelings, not one’s mind."

Ayn Rand (via the-capitalist)

this is a complete butchering of logical positivism, a misunderstanding of Godels Incompleteness Theorem and a straw man but okay. Logical Positivism eventually was proven invalid by Quine, but not for the reasons Rand lists.

(via logicallypositive)

To quote my roommate:

Quine??

QUINE???

(via logicallypositive)

June 13, 2011
"

[T]o be a follower of both Rand and Christ is not possible. The original Objectivist was a type of self-professed anti-Christ who hated Christianity and the self-sacrificial love of its founder. She recognized that those Christians who claimed to share her views didn’t seem to understand what she was saying.


Many conservatives admire Rand because she was anti-collectivist. But that is like admiring Stalin because he opposed Nazism. Stalin was against the Nazis because he wanted to make the world safe for Communism. Likewise, Rand stands against collectivism because she wants the freedom to abolish Judeo-Christian morality. Conservative Christians who embrace her as the “enemy-of-my-enemy” seem to forget that she considered us the enemy,

"

Joe Carter

h/t Sullivan

May 8, 2011
Big Sister Is Watching

In 1957, Conservative magazine National Review published a review of Ayn Rand’s seminal novel, Atlas Shrugged. Those familiar with the National Review will probably be shocked at the treatment Ayn Rand gets in this piece.  

This review, to me, demonstrates the intellectual voracity and degree of reasonableness that the NR used to have to its credit.  Under the tutelage of Jonah Goldberg and his ilk, it has become a shadow of its former self; a magazine of Conservative hacks and intellectual prostitution masquerading as scholarship.  Strong words, I know.  But compare this 1957 piece to the unenlightened vitriol that spews forth from the mouth of Goldberg and Company today, and I think you might feel the same way.

Despite this, I encourage everyone to read this review, which I have reproduced below the break.  You should read it both as evidence of National Review’s former fair-minded disposition, and also for the fact that this 1957 review is an extremely effective dissection of Rand, both as an author, individual, and philosopher.  It exposes not only the impracticability of her ideology, but the downright childish nature of her metaphorical narratives.  But more important still: it makes the vital connection that I have stressed in the past: Ayn Rand’s ideology is subject to the same utopian extremism and willful blindness that made Marxism incapable of practical application, despite its valid arguments.

Several years ago, Miss Ayn Rand wrote The Fountainhead. Despite a generally poor press, it is said to have sold some four hundred thousand copies. Thus, it became a wonder of the book trade of a kind that publishers dream about after taxes. So Atlas Shrugged had a first printing of one hundred thousand copies. It appears to be slowly climbing the best-seller lists.

The news about this book seems to me to be that any ordinarily sensible head could possibly take it seriously, and that, apparently, a good many do. Somebody has called it: “Excruciatingly awful.” I find it a remarkably silly book. It is certainly a bumptious one. Its story is preposterous. It reports the final stages of a final conflict (locale: chiefly the United States, some indefinite years hence) between the harried ranks of free enterprise and the “looters.” These are proponents of proscriptive taxes, government ownership, Labor, etc. etc. The mischief here is that the author, dodging into fiction, nevertheless counts on your reading it as political reality. “This,” she is saying in effect, “is how things really are. These are the real issues, the real sides. Only your blindness keeps you from seeing it, which, happily, I have come to rescue you from.”

Since a great many of us dislike much that Miss Rand dislikes, quite as heartily as she does, many incline to take her at her word. It is the more persuasive, in some quarters, because the author deals wholly in the blackest blacks and the whitest whites. In this fiction everything, everybody, is either all good or all bad, without any of those intermediate shades which, in life, complicate reality and perplex the eye that seeks to probe it truly. This kind of simplifying pattern, of course, gives charm to most primitive story-telling. And, in fact, the somewhat ferro-concrete fairy tale the author pours here is, basically, the old one known as: The War between the Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. In modern dress, it is a class war. Both sides to it are caricatures.

The Children of Light are largely operatic caricatures. In so far as any of them suggests anything known to the business community, they resemble the occasional curmudgeon millionaire, tales about whose outrageously crude and shrewd eccentricities sometimes provide the lighter moments in Board rooms. Otherwise, the Children of Light are geniuses. One of them is named (the only smile you see will be your own): Francisco Domingo Carlos Andres Sebastian d’Anconia. This electrifying youth is the world’s biggest copper tycoon. Another, no less electrifying, is named: Ragnar Danneskjold. He becomes a twentieth-century pirate. All Miss Rand’s chief heroes are also breathtakingly beautiful. So is her heroine (she is rather fetchingly vice president in charge of management of a transcontinental railroad). So much radiant energy might seem to serve a eugenic purpose. For, in this story as in Mark Twain’s, “all the knights marry the princess” — though without benefit of clergy. Yet from the impromptu and surprisingly gymnastic matings of the heroine and three of the heroes, no children — it suddenly strikes you — ever result. The possibility is never entertained. And, indeed, the strenuously sterile world ofAtlas Shrugged is scarcely a place for children. You speculate that, in life, children probably irk the author and may make her uneasy. How could it be otherwise when she admiringly names a banker character (by what seems to me a humorless master-stroke): Midas Mulligan? You may fool some adults; you can’t fool little boys and girls with such stuff — not for long. They may not know just what is out of line, but they stir uneasily.

The Children of Darkness are caricatures, too; and they are really oozy. But at least they are caricatures of something identifiable. Their archetypes are Left Liberals, New Dealers, Welfare Statists, One Worlders, or, at any rate, such ogreish semblances of these as may stalk the nightmares of those who think little about people as people, but tend to think a great deal in labels and effigies. (And neither Right nor Left, be it noted in passing, has a monopoly of such dreamers, though the horrors in their nightmares wear radically different masks and labels.)

In Atlas Shrugged, all this debased inhuman riffraff is lumped as “looters.” This is a fairly inspired epithet. It enables the author to skewer on one invective word everything and everybody that she fears and hates. This spares her the plaguey business of performing one service that her fiction might have performed, namely: that of examining in human depth how so feeble a lot came to exist at all, let alone be powerful enough to be worth hating and fearing. Instead, she bundles them into one undifferentiated damnation.

“Looters” loot because they believe in Robin Hood, and have got a lot of other people believing in him, too. Robin Hood is the author’s image of absolute evil — robbing the strong (and hence good) to give to the weak (and hence no good). All “looters” are base, envious, twisted, malignant minds, motivated wholly by greed for power, combined with the lust of the weak to tear down the strong, out of a deep-seated hatred of life and secret longing for destruction and death. There happens to be a tiny (repeat: tiny) seed of truth in this. The full clinical diagnosis can be read in the pages of Friedrich Nietzsche. (Here I must break in with an aside. Miss Rand acknowledges a grudging debt to one, and only one, earlier philosopher: Aristotle. I submit that she is indebted, and much more heavily, to Nietzsche. Just as her operatic businessmen are, in fact, Nietzschean supermen, so her ulcerous leftists are Nietzsche’s “last men,” both deformed in a way to sicken the fastidious recluse of Sils Maria. And much else comes, consciously or not, from the same source.) Happily, inAtlas Shrugged (though not in life), all the Children of Darkness are utterly incompetent.

So the Children of Light win handily by declaring a general strike of brains, of which they have a monopoly, letting the world go, literally, to smash. In the end, they troop out of their Rocky Mountain hideaway to repossess the ruins. It is then, in the book’s last line, that a character traces in the air, “over the desolate earth,” the Sign of the Dollar, in lieu of the Sign of the Cross, and in token that a suitably prostrate mankind is at last ready, for its sins, to be redeemed from the related evils of religion and social reform (the “mysticism of mind” and the “mysticism of muscle”).

That Dollar Sign is not merely provocative, though we sense a sophomoric intent to raise the pious hair on susceptible heads. More importantly, it is meant to seal the fact that mankind is ready to submit abjectly to an elite of technocrats, and their accessories, in a New Order, enlightened and instructed by Miss Rand’s ideas that the good life is one which “has resolved personal worth into exchange value,” “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash-payment.’” The author is explicit, in fact deafening, about these prerequisites. Lest you should be in any doubt after 1168 pages, she assures you with a final stamp of the foot in a postscript: “And I mean it.” But the words quoted above are those of Karl Marx. He, too, admired “naked self-interest” (in its time and place), and for much the same reasons as Miss Rand: because, he believed, it cleared away the cobwebs of religion and led to prodigies of industrial and cognate accomplishment.

The overlap is not as incongruous as it looks. Atlas Shrugged can be called a novel only by devaluing the term. It is a massive tract for the times. Its story merely serves Miss Rand to get the customers inside the tent, and as a soapbox for delivering her Message. The Message is the thing. It is, in sum, a forthright philosophic materialism. Upperclassmen might incline to sniff and say that the author has, with vast effort, contrived a simple materialist system, one, intellectually, at about the stage of the oxcart, though without mastering the principle of the wheel. Like any consistent materialism, this one begins by rejecting God, religion, original sin, etc. etc. (This book’s aggressive atheism and rather unbuttoned “higher morality,” which chiefly outrage some readers, are, in fact, secondary ripples, and result inevitably from its underpinning premises.) Thus, Randian Man, like Marxian Man, is made the center of a godless world.

At that point, in any materialism, the main possibilities open up to Man. 1) His tragic fate becomes, without God, more tragic and much lonelier. In general, the tragedy deepens according to the degree of pessimism or stoicism with which he conducts his “hopeless encounter between human questioning and the silent universe.” Or, 2) Man’s fate ceases to be tragic at all. Tragedy is bypassed by the pursuit of happiness. Tragedy is henceforth pointless. Henceforth man’s fate, without God, is up to him, and to him alone. His happiness, in strict materialist terms, lies with his own workaday hands and ingenious brain. His happiness becomes, in Miss Rand’s words, “the moral purpose of his life.” Here occurs a little rub whose effects are just as observable in a free enterprise system, which is in practice materialist (whatever else it claims or supposes itself to be), as they would be under an atheist Socialism, if one were ever to deliver that material abundance that all promise. The rub is that the pursuit of happiness, as an end in itself, tends automatically, and widely, to be replaced by the pursuit of pleasure, with a consequent general softening of the fibers of will, intelligence, spirit. No doubt, Miss Rand has brooded upon that little rub. Hence, in part, I presume, her insistence on “man as a heroic being” “with productive achievement as his noblest activity.” For, if Man’s “heroism” (some will prefer to say: “human dignity”) no longer derives from God, or is not a function of that godless integrity which was a root of Nietzsche’s anguish, then Man becomes merely the most consuming of animals, with glut as the condition of his happiness and its replenishment his foremost activity. So Randian Man, at least in his ruling caste, has to be held “heroic” in order not to be beastly. And this, of course, suits the author’s economics and the politics that must arise from them.

For politics, of course, arise, though the author of Atlas Shrugged stares stonily past them, as if this book were not what, in fact, it is, essentially — a political book. And here begins mischief. Systems of philosophic materialism, so long as they merely circle outside this world’s atmosphere, matter little to most of us. The trouble is that they keep coming down to earth. It is when a system of materialist ideas presumes to give positive answers to real problems of our real life that mischief starts. In an age like ours, in which a highly complex technological society is everywhere in a high state of instability, such answers, however philosophic, translate quickly into political realities. And in the degree to which problems of complexity and instability are most bewildering to masses of men, a temptation sets in to let some species of Big Brother solve and supervise them.

One Big Brother is, of course, a socializing elite (as we know, several cut-rate brands are on the shelves). Miss Rand, as the enemy of any socializing force, calls in a Big Brother of her own contriving to do battle with the other. In the name of free enterprise, therefore, she plumps for a technocratic elite (I find no more inclusive word than technocratic to bracket the industrial-financial-engineering caste she seems to have in mind). When she calls “productive achievement” man’s “noblest activity,” she means, almost exclusively, technological achievement, supervised by such a managerial political bureau. She might object that she means much, much more; and we can freely entertain her objections. But, in sum, that is just what she means. For that is what, in reality, it works out to. And in reality, too, by contrast with fiction, this can only head into a dictatorship, however benign, living and acting beyond good and evil, a law unto itself (as Miss Rand believes it should be), and feeling any restraint on itself as, in practice, criminal, and, in morals, vicious — as Miss Rand clearly feels it to be. Of course, Miss Rand nowhere calls for a dictatorship. I take her to be calling for an aristocracy of talents. We cannot labor here why, in the modern world, the pre-conditions for aristocracy, an organic growth, no longer exist, so that impulse toward aristocracy always emerges now in the form of dictatorship.

Nor has the author, apparently, brooded on the degree to which, in a wicked world, a materialism of the Right and a materialism of the Left first surprisingly resemble, then, in action, tend to blend each with each, because, while differing at the top in avowed purpose, and possibly in conflict there, at bottom they are much the same thing. The embarrassing similarities between Hitler’s National Socialism and Stalin’s brand of Communism are familiar. For the world, as seen in materialist view from the Right, scarcely differs from the same world seen in materialist view from the Left. The question becomes chiefly: who is to run that world in whose interests, or perhaps, at best, who can run it more efficiently?

Something of this implication is fixed in the book’s dictatorial tone, which is much its most striking feature. Out of a lifetime of reading, I can recall no other book in which a tone of overriding arrogance was so implacably sustained. Its shrillness is without reprieve. Its dogmatism is without appeal. In addition, the mind which finds this tone natural to it shares other characteristics of its type. 1) It consistently mistakes raw force for strength, and the rawer the force, the more reverent the posture of the mind before it. 2) It supposes itself to be the bringer of a final revelation. Therefore, resistance to the Message cannot be tolerated because disagreement can never be merely honest, prudent, or just humanly fallible. Dissent from revelation so final (because, the author would say, so reasonable) can only be willfully wicked. There are ways of dealing with such wickedness, and, in fact, right reason itself enjoins them. From almost any page of Atlas Shrugged, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: “To a gas chamber — go!” The same inflexibly self-righteous stance results, too (in the total absence of any saving humor), in odd extravagances of inflection and gesture — that Dollar Sign, for example. At first, we try to tell ourselves that these are just lapses, that this mind has, somehow, mislaid the discriminating knack that most of us pray will warn us in time of the difference between what is effective and firm, and what is wildly grotesque and excessive. Soon we suspect something worse. We suspect that this mind finds, precisely in extravagance, some exalting merit; feels a surging release of power and passion precisely in smashing up the house. A tornado might feel this way, or Carrie Nation.

We struggle to be just. For we cannot help feel at least a sympathetic pain before the sheer labor, discipline, and patient craftsmanship that went to making this mountain of words. But the words keep shouting us down. In the end that tone dominates. But it should be its own antidote, warning us that anything it shouts is best taken with the usual reservations with which we might sip a patent medicine. Some may like the flavor. In any case, the brew is probably without lasting ill effects. But it is not a cure for anything. Nor would we, ordinarily, place much confidence in the diagnosis of a doctor who supposes that the Hippocratic Oath is a kind of curse.

April 12, 2011
Applied Rand

A Sullivan reader writes:

My father, too, was a devotee of Ayn Rand, as was my stepmother.  When I was a teenager, there were many spirited arguments at the dinner table over altruism, with my dad and stepmom doggedly clinging to their belief that self-interest was the admirable core of human nature and that any progressive tax system that financed a social safety net was “punishing success.”  

As the years passed, the two most successful children (of five) in the family turned out to be my brother and me.  My stepmom’s kids, because of their own choices, have been less well-off financially.  Imagine my surprise at receiving a phone call from my father a few years before he died, informing me that he was revising his will and asking if I would mind if he left most of his estate to my stepmom’s kids because my brother and I were now wealthy!  I agreed and was happy to do (I’m a left-wing Democrat who thinks  Ayn Rand was nuts), but to my everlasting regret, I didn’t ask Dad if that wasn’t “punishing success!”

My point is, Ayn Rand, like much far right-wing “philosophy,” doesn’t work so well in the real world.

Another reader describes his departure from Objectivism:

Two things conspired to snap me out of the Objectivist sway. One was a few summers working in the great National Parks of the American West, where I realized that it took collective action to protect the magnificent rivers and mountains that I loved exploring (and Rand clearly hated - her protagonists decried the lack of billboards when traveling through raw, “unimproved” nature). I easily replaced Rand with Thoreau, Leopold, Stegner, and Abbey - plenty of misanthropy, rebellion, and audacity for a young man’s taste, but with a better world much more likely to come from it.

The second was a geography professor with a Marxist slant, who exposed me to the spatial complexities of modern societies that refuted at nearly every turn the simple Randian notion that individuals and their individual decisions created optimal solutions. By my senior year, I don’t think I ever thought of Rand as anything but a naive prop of the College Republicans - stuck up preppies whom I couldn’t stand (even if some of that probably stemmed from a touch of self-hatred of my own roots). The point is, Rand has its time and place, but then usually becomes replaced for anyone who travels, reads widely, or gets exposed to other more complex ideas.

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